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ENTRYISM AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF SOUTH AFRICA: 
1923-25 
Baruch Hirson 
The Politics of Entryism 
The activities of socialist groups, and particularly of small socialist groups, are usually 
confined to the footnotes of history. Many tend to be ephemeral or otherwise ineffectual. 
They rise and fall away, giving rise to a host of splinter groupings; they merge with other 
groups and then split away, engage in diverse and often untraced activities. Where records 
are retrievable they often show that these groups consist of a few core activists, even fewer 
publicists, and a smdl set of devotees who provide the necessary finances and facilities. 
There are exceptions. A few groups even grow into large movements embracing thousands, 
or tens of thousands, of members. Some of them have long histories that extend back over 
decades. Yet, even in the long-lived socialist bodies there is a large turn-over in 
membership, with changing programmes (sometimes on central policy issues). Some are 
hyper-active, their members appearing at every picket line and every community action or 
rally; others remain masginalized, either by choice or by fortune. 
It does not follow, however, that the history of small socialist groups is of interest only to the 
antiquarian. While small groups are often taken to reflect social conditions, the equation can 
be reversed and social conditions can be deduced from the behaviour of these groups. It is in 
this light that I want to look at the issue of entryism in the history of the Communist Party of 
South Africa (CPSA) in the early 1920s. 
Before proceeding, something must be said about "entryism". The fact that the concept is 
more usually used in a pejorative sense, and most usually to relate to the "nefarious" 
activities of some political parties, should not divert attention from the fact that groups and 
individuals, in the course of social action, move in and out of larger institutions. The 
problem for socialist groups lies in their need for a base larger than the one they can create 
themselves. Members of socialist groups, or at times the group as a whole, have worked in 
trade unions and co-operatives, entered community bodies, and in South Africa in a later 
period have functioned inside, or in alliance with, national liberation movements. Such 
activities are not unusual and usually go unremarked. 
It is not my intention in this paper to praise or condemn "entryism" as a principle. The 
problems are part of a larger debate among socialists on the kind of organizations with which 
it is permissible to work and the need to preserve the socialist group's identity. But, 
ultimately, it is my contention that no smdl, tightly-knit political group can ever be effective 
unless it finds a milieu in which it can approach persons who are in agreement with its basic 
aims. 
The Earliest Contacts 
From their inception, the groups that were formed during the First World War [l] and later 
banded together to form the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) sought a constituency 
in which to work and put their programme to work. The common principles on which they 
agreed - the struggle against capitalism; the rejection of racialism; and an internationalism 
that was linked to Moscow - confronted them with the need to find a base among the working 
class. 
Yet, from the outset, these groups had to face problems that were unique to the South Afiican 
situation. Although the country was undoubtdy capitalist, industrialization in South Africa 
outside the mines was rudimentary. The skilled and semi-skilled workers were mainly white. 
Africans filled most of the unskilled occupations, from farm labour to domestic service; 
from migrant labourers on the mines to manual workers in the shops and factories. [2] 
Information on the black workers in the early 1920s is not easily obtainable, but in 1924, 
when there were 19,000 whites and 190,000 blacks employed on the gold mines, one 
estimate suggests that there were 13,000 white workers and 20,000 blacks employed on the 
Rand, most in light consumer goods, and in the metal and building industries. The number of 
African workers in the other provinces was even lower. However, if statistics are not 
available, a survey of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union of Africa (ICU) does 
provide a graphic picture of the persons who were recruited into the first black "trade union". 
This body had its origins in Bloemfontein, where the location inhabitants rallied 
unsuccessfully behind Selby Msimang, a young intellectual, to obtain a minimum wage for 
the town. The defeat of that strike was significant on two counts: firstly, it discouraged the 
extension of the union northwards, and, secondly, it left the field open in which Wements 
Kadalie could develop a movement, of the same name but with a different constituency. 
The focus of the ICU shifted to Cape Town, where it was more successful. Precisely who re- 
established the ICU is, in my opinion, open to question. The accepted account, partly 
retailed by Kadalie, was that a white socialist, Albert Batty, who was seeking an electoral 
base, had come upon him during a dispute in the street and, without much ado, invited him to 
participate in organizing the dock workers. He was soon established as union leader and, hey 
presto, the union was on its way. What happened to others who were organizing dock 
workers, including Hamilton Kraai and Reuben Cetyewa, formally associated with the ISL, is 
not told. But even accepting Kadalie9s story, the men who were organized were mainly the 
Coloured workers, and when a strike was called (and won) it was the Coloureds who gained 
a wage increase. This was the only early industrial action led by the ICU that succeeded. 
Leaving aside the Masabalala incident in Port Elizabeth, which had its own local dynamic - 
and which did not lead to the formation of a union b m c h  in any but name - the ICU as an 
organization seems in the f i s t  years to have organized branches mainly in the countryside. 
The one event in which the ICU figured prominently, by chance rather than design, followed 
the riot in the Bloemfontein locations in 1925. This led to the establishment of a local wages 
commission on which blacks (including members of the ICU) were invited to sit. The result 
was precisely the minimum wage agreement for the town that had been demanded in 
1919.131 
Search as one may, there were no signs of organization among black industrial workers for 
most of the decade: none among mine workers nor among blacks in brick-making or the 
metal industries, most of whom were accommodated in compounds which were closed to 
"outsiders". From 1919 to 1925 the ICU existed almost exclusively in the Cape and in Natal, 
Only thereafter did it move into the Transvaal but with no record of organization in industry: 
their groups in the Transvaal formed not in factories but in the townships and, of course, in 
the countryside. The reason lay not in any default by Kadalie or his organizers (whatever 
other criticism there may be) but in the fact that the black working class was inchoate, was 
not congregated in large factories, and was quite unformed. 
For the small CPSA, there were insoluble problems. By training and inclination they sought 
the workers on the shop floor - and because this brought them into contact with the trade 
unions their contacts were almost all white. Secondly, in their use of the electoral machine 
(as required by the Comintern), their constituency outside the Cape was exclusively white. 
Thirdly, even if they wished to organize in the community, they were excluded by law (and 
also by inaccessibility) from entering black locations. In 1919, when Ivon Jones was tried in 
Pietemaritzburg under war-time regulations for distributing leaflets, he said under cross- 
examination that he had never been into a location or a Reserve. This was undoubtedly the 
case for most white Communists until the late 1920s. 
The consequence for the ISL and InSL, and later the CPSA, was marked. Try as they would, 
they made little headway in their attempt at recruiting black workers. This despite the fact 
that the ISL was the first political body to form a black workers' organization, participated in 
the early post-war Rand strike, protested in Cape Town over the Bulhoek massacre, and so 
on. The issue was not easily decided [4] - but, ultimately, the belief that the white workers 
would form the base of the struggle for socialism governed CPSA policy-making. 
Then came the General Strike of 1922 - and, despite some initial equivocation, the CPSA 
came out in favour of the white miners. [5] The nature of the strike has been a controversial 
issue now for nearly seventy years, evoking sharp reactions among socialists who are still 
divided on the role of the white miners in their struggle against the mine-owners. Although 
precipitated by a wage cut and demands that the cuts be restored, the issue was widened by 
the claim of white miners that they would be replaced by blacks at a fraction of the wages 
they were being paid. Wages and the colour bar were inseparable and, in the ensuing battles, 
racial tension rose in the Transvaal. There were attacks on race grounds, and the capitalist 
press took delight in highlighting such encounters. None the less, Ivon Jones, writing from 
Moscow, maintained that: 
It was not a conflict of whites against blacks, but a pure class 
struggle between the politically conscious workers, who 
happened to be white, and the capitalist class ... The 
international offensive of capitalism spreads to the colonies ... 
In South Africa it takes the form of a demand on the part of the 
Chamber of Mines that the mining regulations be altered to 
allow cheap native labour into more skilled positions. This 
means larger gangs of natives working under fewer skilled 
whites ... a demand for the general reduction of wages [and] a 
reduction of one fifth in the number of white workers ... Hence 
it was for the white workers a question of very existence. 
(Communist Internationat 1922) 
For the CPSA it was also a question of "very existeince". They believed the white miners to 
be "politically conscious workers", and backed them, underestimating the impact of racial 
antagonisms opened up by the strike. 
The one vocal critic inside the party was Frank Glass, secretary of the Cape Town branch. 
His view must be stated, not only because of the position he took then, but also because of 
the role he was to play later in supporting the call for entry into the SAW. Writing in the 
International (17 February), Glass stated that the white workers were too backward, their 
trade unions too weak, and the party's forces too insignificant to make a revolution - and part 
of the reason lay in the racism of the white workers which disqualified them as leaders of a 
united working class. The evidence, however, is blurred. Glass, as a loyal member of the 
party, would not have opposed the strike, and the Simons state that he spoke in Cape Town in 
favour of the miners. [6] Whatever his reservations, after the bombing of the Rand, Glass 
attacked the savagery with which the strike had been crushed. A resolution he drew up was 
presented to a mass meeting in Cape Town condemning the brutal suppression of the Rand 
strike, demanding that no person participating in the strike be executed or deported, and that 
Martial Law be raised immediately. Claiming further that the Government had shown its 
"utter incapacity to rule South Africa in the interests of the majority of its citizens", he called 
for its immediate resignation. Lastly, it called for a Commission of Enquiry to investigate 
events on the Rand to "counteract the mass of lying calumnies which have been hurled at the 
Rand Workers by the Capitalist Press". 
He then used the events of the strike to explain the nature of government in simple terms. It 
is not certain when he wrote this article, but it was probably published before he left Cape 
Town. I quote from his typescript. [7] Headed "Death to Capitalism: Avenge Your 
Slaughtered Comrades", the opening sentences referred to the slaughter of March 1922, and 
compared it to the shootings of July 1913, Port Elizabeth and Bulhoek. Then, to explain why 
the ruling class acted in this vicious way, Glass discussed the nature of the struggle between 
capitalists and the working class, using as texts Marx's Wage, Labour and Capital and the 
Communist Manifesto. The task of government, said Glass, was to maintain the ruling class 
in power and suppress the periodical uprisings of the oppressed class. Ultimately, the 
oppressed classes had always triumphed, replacing the old society with the new - but 
hitherto all societies had been based on inequality. In the twentieth century the "slave class 
of modernity" had the task of "destroying for ever all slave relations by destroying the 
system of the private ownership of the means of production ... [7] 
In the modem period, he wrote, there were giant upheavals that "rock Capitalism to its very 
foundation". One such example was the Rand Strike. Then, deviating from the position he 
had taken earlier, he said: 
From the point of view of immediate practical advantages, the 
Rand Strike cannot be said to have been a success, but, viewed 
in the broad perspective of the general progress of the Labour 
Movement, it has undoubtedly been productive of much good. 
The workers have gained practical knowledge and experience 
in the field of action. The remorseless fact of the class- 
struggle, together with the real function of the Government in 
that struggle, has been driven home with sledge-hammer force. 
The futility of attempting to better their conditions under 
Capitalism; the urgent necessity for class-solidarity 
irrespective of colour, race or creed, in the face of the 
Capitalist attack, are lessons, let us hope that have been equally 
well learnt. 
In conclusion, Glass spoke confidently of a forward movement of the working class and the 
destruction of the existing system. The tensions in Glass's approach are evident and it was 
thus no surprise when, two years later, in March 1924, on the second anniversary of the 
strike, he wrote an article in the International in praise of the miners in their struggle with 
the Chamber of Mines. The revolt, he said, would 
... ever be remembered as one of the most glorious episodes in 
the proletarian struggle in South Africa, if not, indeed, of the 
world. It is indelibly stamped on the pages of universal 
working-class history as is, for instance, the Paris Commune of 
the year 1871. As with the Paris workers in that year, so in 
1922 did the workers of this country receive their first real 
baptism of fire and blood. 
In both these articles Glass followed many of the views expressed by Ivon Jones (see above), 
who had said that the strike was "the first great armed revolt of the workers on any scale in 
the British Empire". Jones went further, voicing criticism of the racist attacks on blacks, but 
claiming that these were isolated events and exaggerated by the press. Glass was strangely 
silent on the matter or race: claiming only that, "Alone of all Labour organisations, the 
Communist Party justified and defended the heroic workers of the Rand", and he contrasted 
this with the Labourite and trade union leaders who, dissociating themselves from the events 
of March 1922, had said "You shouldn't have gone so far". 
At some point in 1922 Frank Glass left Cape Town for Johannesburg. There he acted as an 
organizer for the CPSA and also entered the trade union movement as General Secretary- 
Organizer of the Witwatersrand Tailors Association. 
The Entryist Tactic 
In the aftermath of the strike of 1922 the CPSA found itself increasingly isolated. The white 
workers of the Rand had suffered a massive defeat and, after burying their dead and calling 
for the release of those in prison, there were few who would have dared to call for further 
battles. There was no more talk of direct working-class action to oust the capitalists, and 
nobody perceived in the black workers their possible allies. Rather, their thoughts turned to 
the next general election and of campaigning alongside the Nationalists against their common 
enemies: the mine-owners and Smuts, their champion. The communists found that they had 
little room for manoeuvre and had no viable plans for increasing their membership or 
planning new campaigns. It was under these circumstances that the party accepted the 
directive of the Fourth Congress of the Communist International in November 1922: namely, 
that it was necessary to call for a united front of the working class in order to win the 
organized working class away from the social democrats. [a] 
To apply the tactic, the party could only turn to the South African Labour Party. For many, 
this seemed an absurd move which negated the very principles on which the ISL and the 
CPSA had been based. The SAW was an exclusively white party, which prided itself on 
being the first to have called for the complete segregation of the country, the repatriation of 
all Africans to the Reserves and of Indians to the Indian continent. Yet, the demoralization 
inside the CPSA was so extensive that only a few party members (apparently grouped round 
Wilfred Harrison and Manuel Lopes in Cape Town) spoke out against work inside the SAW. 
Moreover, there were few alternatives. There was no place for the predominantly white party 
in the South African Native National Congress, which had an exclusively black membership 
(and which eschewed the radical approach of the CP), and work with the Industrial and 
Commercial Workers Union (ICU) was still a matter for the future. There was one other 
organization, centred in the Transvaal, called the Joint Council of Europeans and Natives, 
and Bunting explored the possibility of joining it. It had been set up at the suggestion of 
members of the Stokes-Phelps Commission on Education which toured the country between 
February and April 1921. They were perturbed by what they perceived as evidence of 
increased racial friction and suggested to liberal whites that, following similar experiences in 
the USA, they set up bodies to bring the ethnic groups together for informed discussions. 
Local Councils, composed (theoretically) of equal numbers of whites and Africans, although 
limited in number to less than forty, maintained contact through cultural, scouting and sport 
facilities with the majority of politically active Africans. When formed, the stated objective 
was to lessen friction between whites and blacks and to improve conditions under which 
Africans lived. The factors that led to the organization of these groups was the belief that the 
situation in the country was volatile and that only the winning of the hearts and minds of the 
educated Africans could avert an explosion. There was also an opinion, expressed less 
openly, that there was a race for the "soul" of the African - and that if this race was not won 
by Christians, the Communists would surely win. Given these premises there was little 
possibility of Communists being invited to join the Council. None the less, Bunting made 
such an attempt. He spoke to Herbert Hosken, the secretary in Johannesburg, and on 16 June 
1923 he wrote confirming his verbal application for membership. [g] The outcome was 
never in doubt: Bunting was not accepted in the body. 
An application for affiliation was also sent to the SALP in April 1923, but was rejected. The 
reasons for this rejection are complex. The SALP had approached the ISL in 1919 and 
suggested that the war issue, which had led to the initial split, was no longer a political factor 
and the two groups should unite. The ISL had rejected the approach. By 1922 the CPSA 
had moved even further from the SALP and during the strike the mainstream of Labour had 
found common cause with the Nationalists. Both Labour and the Nationalists used the 
rhetoric of anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism and this opened up the possibility of an 
electoral alliance between Labour and the Nationalist Party in the forthcoming general 
election. 
The CPSA was again in a quandary. The main enemy was seen to be Smuts, the 
representative of the mine-owners and the man who had brought out the airplanes to bombard 
the strikers. When the general election was called in mid- 1924, the membership believed 
that the obvious path was to support the Labour-Nationalist alliance and topple the Smuts 
government. Yet, it seems as if the party was either divided on policy or moved towards the 
right as the election date came nearer. Roux, in his biography of Bunting, claims that a 
minority on the party executive (Bunting, Roux and W K&) had difficulty in getting any 
reference to blacks in the CPSA election manifesto, only managing to add two points to the 
list of demands after much argument: a call for the abolition of the pass laws, and a call for 
"the extension of educational facilities to all sections of the population" (p 65). 
W H Andrews, among others, considered the party's appeal to Africans either inappropriate 
or irrelevant. However, earlier in the year the Johannesburg branch of the CPSA printed a 
leaflet, "Watchman, What of the Night?": an appeal pointedly directed to the white workers 
which adopted a view far more radical than that quoted in Roux's book - and not mentioned 
elsewhere. [l01 
Pointing to the possibility of an election in 1924, the "Watchman" leaflet spoke of the 
deleterious effects of the defeat of the 1922 strike on the workers and called on every worker 
to see that Smuts was defeated. The writer would have preferred workers to be in the 
Communist Party but, because that was impossible, called for a vote for the SALP or the 
Nationalists. "We have got to make perfectly sure of winning this event ... But winning 
elections is not enough", he said. The trade unions had to be built up; the Industrial 
Conciliation Bill had to be fought because it was an impediment to strike action; and the 
unemployed had to be organized lest they be used as scabs. Even this was insufficient. The 
black workers could neither be removed nor ignored, he said. 
With all our years of experience here, can we hope that the 
white workers by themselves will beat the enemy? How can 
you expect to win a strike, for instance, when only one man in 
ten comes out - which is what we tried to do in 1922? 
Remember the native worker is not just a neutral. He has 
become today a powerful tool in the hands of the masters who, 
while we were indifferent or hostile, have been sedulously 
spreading their net to capture him. 
He warned that the black workers had started their own organization as "self-protection 
against 'white' oppression". It was essential that the black worker be won over to the 
working-class movement and that he be assisted in improving his lot. But, he warned, this 
was only part of a world-wide problem "inherent in the capitalist system itself, which on a 
world scale pits worker against worker in a futile struggle". Yet, with the dissolving of 
Parliament, this appeal was set aside and the party avoided the colour question, deciding not 
to field candidates lest they split the vote of the anti-Smuts camp. Only in Parktown 
(Johannesburg), where the government candidate was unopposed, did the CPSA nominate a 
candidate. Glass was chosen but he withdrew when Labour entered the hustings. 
The Nationalist-Labour alliance defeated Smuts at the election and formed a coalition 
government. This raised new problems for the CPSA. Although the party had urged voters 
to support the anti-Smuts government, they baulked at the idea of Labour buttressing a 
government that was dedicated to upholding the capitalist system. S P Bunting, who drew up 
the CPSA's election manifesto, said that the party had come "To Bury Caesar, not to praise 
the Pact", and that a vote for the Pact was "a step towards Worker's control of the means of 
production and self-determination in a Workers' Republic". Now, after the election, the 
CPSA called for Labour to stay outside the government and act, instead, as an independent 
force that would hold the balance of power in Parliament. [l l] All to no avail. Labour 
joined the cabinet and there was no evidence of disaffection among its ranks, leaving 
communists even more isolated than before. 
Later that year, in SeptemberIOctober, the CPSA nominated two candidates in the Municipal 
elections: H Perreira in Hanover Street (Cape Town), and Glass in Jeppers (Johannesburg). 
A third communist, T Chapman, stood as an independent in Benoni. Perreira and Chapman 
received 128 and 131 votes; Glass received a more creditable 259 votes against 589 votes for 
his Labour opponent. Although the party report claimed that this showed that there was an 
increasing number of voters who were "favourable to the principles of the Communist 
Party7', there could have been few illusions about the immediate prospects of party growth. 
In his election manifesto and "election address" Frank Glass said that his message was 
directed to the working class "and not to the big property-owner" whose vote "he did not 
i expect or wish to get". In any other country his programme would have been unexceptional: demands for an end to poverty and unemployment; an end to slums and to corruption; the 1 building of "a community of really free and equal citizens". But in South Africa this was 
l unreal - avoiding all mention of black disabilities and directed at only the one section of the 
population that had the vote. 
Glass claimed in his notes that the only working-class party in South Africa was the 
Communist Party. The SALP, he said, was little more than a Liberal Party, not entitled to 
use the title "Labour". Yet, on 27-28 December, when the CPSA met in conference, Glass 
was the main speaker who urged (against the majority) that the party affiliate to the SALP. 
Glass rested his case on the fact that, unlike Europe, the communists had made little headway 
in English-speaking countries (the US, Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South 
Africa), while social democratic parties had grown in strength. He did not offer any reason 
for this difference: but only said that the difference was observable. This had led to the 
formulation of the United Front tactic, designed to break down the isolation of the 
communist parties. The British and American parties had broken down isolation and gained 
an influence through working with or within other parties. The CPSA had to take the same 
course if it was to win the workers to its ranks - not only through formal application for 
affiliation but by entering the trade unions and Labour Party branches. If this were not done 
the party would "remain a comparatively small propaganda sect, isolated from, and 
consequently possessing no decisive say in, the affairs of the [working class] movement". 
Glass was talking about winning white workers, but was careful to note that the party had to 
find its way to both black and white masses. He even said that through the SALP there 
would be access to Coloured and African voters - and there is no indication that he cast any 
aspersions at the black worker, as stated subsequently by communist historians. In fact, an 
unknown informer at the conference, reported in the Department of Justice files, ascribed 
remarks with a racist slant to W H Andrews! 
This time the resolution on affiliation was narrowly defeated and Frank Glass resigned from 
the executive committee of the party. The thinking of both Andrews and Glass appears to 
have been reinforced by a letter written to the former by Ivon Jones, dying in a sanatorium in 
Yalta. Jones had suggested that the CPSA be dissolved temporarily and that communists 
regain their position among workers via the trade unions. Meanwhile, a nucleus should 
publish a journal and through this protect the interests of the black workers. He also urged 
the South African communists to establish a book shop. Jones's advice seems to have 
influenced Glass, and this is borne out in one of his last reminiscences just a few weeks 
before his death. In answer to questions I asked in a letter, Glass said that he could 
remember little of the events in South Africa, and then remarked on the fact that Andrews 
used to read Jones's letters to him, and these were always filled with optimism over the 
future of socialism. 
Andrews and Glass withdrew from the Central Executive in December 1924, but it is not 
known whether they formally resigned from the CPSA. Both the Simons and Roux (in his 
biography of Bunting, p 68) say that Glass left the CPSA. Furthermore, according to Roux, 
Glass left the party immediately after the conference, and then made a statement during an 
interview to the Star that Africans could not appreciate the noble ideas of communism. I 
searched through the Star but could not find this interview. However, there was a letter 
signed by Roux, as General Secretary of the CPSA, on 4 March 1925, written in response to 
press reports. He said that neither Andrews nor Glass had left the party, and that Glass had 
resigned as treasurer because of pressure of trade union work. It is possible that this letter 
was itself only a half-truth, to cover an uncomfortable position. Roux's subsequent 
ascription of racist statements to Glass seems to be totally incorrect. As mentioned above, 
the statements Roux put in Glass's mouth were actually made by Andrews. 
After the December conference, many members of the CPSA drifted away and were not 
heard of again. But Glass was secretary of the Witwatersrand Tailors' Association and 
together with Andrews played a prominent part in the white trade union movement. On 27 
March the Star, claiming that the communists had captured control of the trade union 
movement, carried the news that Andrews had been elected secretary, and Glass treasurer, of 
the trade union federation, the South African Association of Employees' Organizations. 
Frank Glass's subsequent political activities are not clear. He might have joined the SALP 
(which communists were allowed to do on an individual basis). However, he would have I 
been isolated there after the events at the March trade union conference. Creswell, the SALP l 
leader and Minister of Labour in the Nationalist-Labour Pact government, sought support for 
his Wages Bill and his proposed Emergency Powers Bill at the assembly. Glass moved the 
motion repudiating the latter, describing the measure as "oppressive", and called for its 
withdrawal. Only an amendment to postpone the introduction of the legislation for a year, I 
which got overwhelming support, stopped the complete rejection of the Bill. 1121 
Glass does not seem to have resumed work in the party, but we know that he moved from a 
position of leadership in the white trade unions to a precarious position in the major African 
trade union movement - the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union of Africa. In 
September 1925 he and Andrews appeared on an ICU platform, and successfully called for 
support for the British seamen who had walked off the ships in protest against a wage cut. 
This appears to have been the prelude to a change in Frank Glass's, if not Andrews', 
appraisal of the working class in South Africa. 
Notes 
1 I refer primarily to the International Socialist League (ISL) in Johannesburg and the 
Industrial Socialist League (InSL) in Cape Town. 
2 I do not pretend that this is an accurate picture of population occupations. I exclude the 
Coloured workers in the western Cape who also occupied positions as artisans or 
worked in light industry, and Indians who worked in the sugar mills, coal mines, and so 
on. 
3 This despite the difference between the demand and the final settlement. In 1919 the 
demand was for a minimum wage of 4s 6d per day. The wage agreed after the 1925 
riot was 3s 6d per day. 
4 See the debate between S P Bunting and Ivon Jones et al, reprinted in Searchlight 
South Africa, No 1. 
5 The strike is discussed in some detail by Gwyn Williams and myself in a forthcoming 
biography of Jones, using hitherto unpublished documents. I quote from the relevant 
section. 
6 J H and R E Simons, Class and Colour in South Africa: 1850-1950 (Penguin, 1969), 
p 294. Unfortunately, they do not footnote this item and it is not possible to check their 
statement. 
7 This must remain a guess because the typescript is undated, and in any case it is not 
known when Glass left for Johannesburg. 
8 S P Bunting, who had been a delegate at the Comintern Congress, endorsed the 
International's directive in an "Open Letter" in the International of 30 March 1923. 
9 This letter was found in the papers of J D Rheinallt Jones, the dominant figure in the 
Joint Council movement. 
10 This leaflet was almost definitely written by Glass and was found in his papers at 
Concordia. 
11 "A Vital Issue: Should Labour Enter the Cabinet?" a leaflet directed to delegates at a 
special conference of the SALP on 29 June 1924. 
12 The constitution of the Association, a list of resolutions to be introduced, and the 
minutes of the Congress are included with the Glass papers at Concordia. 
